Pickens v. Johnson [DISSENT] by Carter, Jesse W.
Golden Gate University School of Law
GGU Law Digital Commons
Jesse Carter Opinions The Jesse Carter Collection
3-1-1954
Pickens v. Johnson [DISSENT]
Jesse W. Carter
Supreme Court of California
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/carter_opinions
Part of the Property Law and Real Estate Commons
This Opinion is brought to you for free and open access by the The Jesse Carter Collection at GGU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Jesse Carter Opinions by an authorized administrator of GGU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
jfischer@ggu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Carter, Jesse W., "Pickens v. Johnson [DISSENT]" (1954). Jesse Carter Opinions. Paper 275.
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/carter_opinions/275
Mar. 1954] PICKENS v. JOHNSON 
[ 42 C.2d 399; 267 P .2d BOll 
[Sac. No. 6378. In Bank. Mar. 1, 1954.] 
399 
LA WRENOE L. PICKENS et al., Appellants, v. FRED C. 
JOHNSON et al., Respondents. 
FRED C. JOHNSON et al., Respondents, v. LA WRENOE 
L. PI OKENS et al., Appellants. 
[1] Judges- Retirement- Constitutional Provision Enabling.-
Const., art. IV, § 22a, declaring that Legislature may provide 
state retirement system, is an enabling provision authorizing 
Legislature to provide system for retirement of members of 
judicial department of state embraced within Judges' Retire-
ment Law. (Stats. 1937, p. 2204.) 
[2] !d.-Retirement-Assignment and Service of Retired Judge.-
The provision for assignment and service of a retired judge 
in accordance with Judges' Retirement Law bears a reasonable 
relationship to system of judges' retirement; it is inherently 
connected with problems of administration of justice under 
which the state, in consideration for retirement allowance, 
may invoke assistance of retired personnel of judicial depart-
ment in emergencies found to exist by chairman of Judicial 
Council. 
[3] !d.-Retirement-Status of Retired Judge.-The Constitution 
does not prohibit the Legislature from providing, as it has in 
Judges' Retirement Act, § 6, that so long as he receives a re-
tirement allowance a retired judge shall be a judicial officer 
of the state. 
[4] Id.-Retirement-Prerequisites.-In order for a superior court 
judge to retire he must, while in office, file his notice of retire-
ment with Secretary of State as provided in Judges' Retire-
ment Act, § 1. (Stats. 1937, p. 2204.) 
[5] !d.-Retirement--Privileges and Duties.-While in retirement 
a judge has privilege of maintaining his membership in State 
Bar, and as such he is entitled to privileges and immunities 
and is subject to duties and obligations of an attorney at law 
so long as he maintains his membership in State Bar. 
[6] !d.-Retirement-Effect of Assignment.-A retired judge's 
assignment as judge of superior court for designated county 
by chairman of Judicial Council does not prolong his term of 
office, but merely has effect of vesting in him powers of judge 
of superior court during period specified in assignment. 
[7] !d.-Retirement--Term of Assignment.-Under proper exercise 
of power of assignment a retired judge will not be continued 
McK. Dig. References: [1-17] Judges, § 17.5; [18] Landlord and 
'fenant, § 259. 
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in service indefinitely, the term of assignment being necessarily 
within wise discretion of chairman of Judicial Council. 
[8] !d.-Retirement-Status After Expiration of Assignment.-
Upon expiration of period of his assignment a retired judge 
resumes his prior status as a retired judge. 
[9] Id.- Retirement- Validity of Assignment.-Judges' Retire-
ment Act, § 6, does not offend any constitutional provision on 
ground that an assignment thereunder is an unlawful increase 
in number of judges to county to which retired judge is as-
signed, since Constitution does not limit number of superior 
court judges in any county. 
[10] !d.-Retirement-Validity of Assignment.-The increase in 
compensation provided in Judges' Retirement Act, § 6, to be 
paid to retired judges while under assignment is not incon-
sistent with any constitutional provision, the compensation to 
be paid to superior court judges being for Legislature to de-
termine under Const., art. VI, § 17. 
[11] !d.-Retirement-Effect of Assignment.-Const., art. VI, § 8, 
providing that term of office of superior court judge shall be 
six years, does not set at nought obvious purpose of assign-
ment provisions of Judges' Retirement Act, since in no proper 
sense is term of a judge extended by his retirement or by his 
assignment after retirement. 
[12] !d.-Retirement-Status of Retired Judge.-The fact that 
under Judges' Retirement Act,§ 6, retired judge while receiving 
retirement allowance is declared to be a judicial officer of the 
state (but without any power as such except while under as-
sigmnent) should be considered as nothing more than making 
him eligible for assignment, since it would be unreasonable to 
conclude that while not under assignment he would be subject 
to conditions that attach to status and activities of an incum-
bent judge. 
[13] !d.-Retirement-Status of Retired Judge.-When a retired 
judge is assigned, he voluntarily assumes status of a regular 
judge and would necessarily be governed by same conditions. 
[14] Id.-Retirement-Prerequisites.-Under Judges' Retirement 
Act no stipulation of counsel is required as a prerequisite to 
assignment of retired superior court judge to preside as a 
judge of superior court in any county in state, the provision 
for stipulation of counsel in Const., art. VI, § 5, having by 
its own terms to do only with establishment of court through 
medium of a pro tempore judge, selected from membership of 
the har by stipulation of counsel to try a particular case, and 
whose selection must be approved by superior court. 
[15] !d.-Retirement-Assignment and Service of Retired Judge. 
-Const., art. VI, § la, making it duty of chairman of Judici:1l 
Council to seek to expedite judicial business of state, to equal-
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ize work of judges, and to provide for assignment of incum-
bent judges from one county to another under certain con-
ditions, does not prohibit assignment of a retired judge. 
[16] !d.-Retirement-Assignment and Service of Retired Judge. 
-Whether as a matter of policy the system of assignment of 
retired judges should be put into effect is for people to de-
termine through Constitution or by Legislature, and it is not 
a matter subject to judicial control where it has been plainly 
declared by legislative authority. 
[17] !d.-Retirement-Status of Judge Trying Case Under Assign-
ment.-A retired judge trying a case under assignment acts 
as a judge de jure, and his conduct in trying case and render-
ing judgment therein cannot be questioned on appeal. 
[18] Landlord and Tenant-Remedies of Tenant-Damages.-
Value of use of premises leased for operation of liquor business 
from date of illegal reentry by lessors to end of lease term was 
properly found to be $400 per month where there was evidence 
that net income from business was over $7,000 for 12-month 
period prior to unlawful reentry and that lease called for a 
rental of $225 per month, and it was proper to award lessees an 
additional $4,500 as damages for value of liquor license, where 
there was evidence that liquor license alone was worth $10,000, 
and that a separate price was fixed for use of premises (the 
lease) and for sale of license and equipment under a con-
ditional sale contract. 
APPEAL from judgments of the Superior Court of Sacra-
mento County. James 0. Moncur, Judge.* Affirmed. 
Consolidated actions for declaratory relief, and for dam-
ages for forcible entry and unlawful detainer. Judgments 
for respondents affirmed. 
F. H. Bowers and Thomas F. Sargent for Appellants. 
McAllister & Johnson and Walter C. Frame for Re-
spondents. 
SHENK, J.-This is an appeal from judgments in favor 
of the Johnsons, husband and wife, for $4,500 and $15,400, 
respectively, in actions consolidated for trial and on appeal. 
The Pickens, husband and wife, commenced an action in 
Sacramento County, for declaratory relief involving their 
rights under a lease from the Pickens to the Johnsons of 
premises owned by the Pickens. Their rights under a con-
*Assigned by Chairman of Judicial Council. 
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tract of conditional sale of the business and equipment on 
the premises leased by the Pickens from the J ohnsons were 
also involved. The J ohnsons brought an action in the same 
court against the Pickens for damages for the forcible entry 
and unlawful detainer of the premises. The actions were 
consolidated for trial and tried without a jury. 
Before approaching the merits of the appeal a preliminary 
constitutional question raised by the Pickens must be dis-
posed of. 
The cases were tried before the Honorable J. 0. Moncur 
who was elected in 1944 as judge of the Superior Court of 
Plumas County for the full term of six years. He discharged 
the duties of that office until the last day of his term (Jan. 
8, 1951) when he retired pursuant to the provisions of the 
Judges' Retirement Act (Stats. 1937, p. 2204). At the 
time this consolidated action was tried Judge Moncur was 
sitting in the Superior Court of Sacramento County pursuant 
to an assignment to that task by the chairman of the Judicial 
Council as provided in section 6 of the act as amended in 
1951. (Stats. 1951, p. 3694.) At the time of the assign-
ment that section provided, and still provides, in its pertinent 
parts as follows : 
"Sec. 6. Justices and judges retired under the provisions 
of this act, so long as they are entitled by its provisions to 
receive a retirement allowance, shall be judicial officers of the 
State, but shall not exercise any of the powers of a justice 
or judge except while under assignment to a court as here-
inafter provided. Any such retired justice or judge may, 
with his own consent, be assigned by the Chairman of the 
,Judicial Council in a court of like jurisdiction as, or higher 
jurisdiction than, that court from which he has retired; 
and while so assigned shall have all the powers of a 
justice or judge thereof. If assigned to sit in a court, he 
shall be paid while sitting therein in addition to his retirement 
allowances the difference, if any, between his retirement 
allowance and the compensation of a judge of the court to 
which he is assigned." 
It is the contention of the Pickens that the foregoing 
section of the Judges' Retirement Act is unconstitutional 
and that any judgment rendered by Judge Moncur while 
under assignment is void. 
As authority for the adoption of the Judges' Retirement 
Act and particularly section 6 as amended in 1951, reliance 
is placed on section 22a of article IV of the Constitution 
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adopted in 1930. The pertinent parts of that section are 
as follows: ''The Legislature shall have power to provide 
for the payment of retirement salaries to employees of the 
State who shall qualify therefor by service in the work of 
the State as provided by law. The Legislature shall have 
power to fix and from time to time change the requirements 
and conditions for retirement which shall include a minimum 
period of service, a minimum attained age and minimum con-
tribution of funds by such employees and such other condi-
tions as the Legislature may prescribe. . . . '' 
Under the authority of the foregoing constitutional section 
the I1egislature in 1931 enacted the statute establishing a 
system for the retirement of the employees of the state (Stats. 
1931, p. 1442) and it has been in continuous operation since 
that time. 
In 1948 the question was presented to this court whether 
section 22a of article IV of the Constitution conferred upon 
the Legislature the power to provide a retirement system 
for its own members. It was held in the case of Knight v. 
Board of Administration of State Emp. R. System, 32 Cal.2d 
400 [186 P.2d 547, 5 A.L.R.2d 410), that section 22a was an 
enabling act; that the term ''employees'' included officers of 
the state; that members of the Legislature were officers of 
the state, and that under the section the Legislature was 
authorized to establish a retirement system for its members 
as provided for in the Legislators' Retirement Law of 1947. 
(Gov. Code, § 9350 et seq. ; Stats. 194 7, p. 2058.) The validity 
of that statute was upheld by unanimous decision of this 
court. 
[1] There can be no doubt that section 22a as construed 
in the Knight case was and is an enabling provision of the 
Constitution authorizing the Legislature to provide a system 
for the retirement of the members of the judicial department 
of the state embraced within the Judges' Retirement Law. 
In fact, there is here no contention to the contrary. That 
act, as stated, was adopted in 1937. Section 6 was then in 
its present form with the exception of a provision added 
by amendment in 1951. The section was first amended in 
1941 (Stats. 1941, p. 2938) to provide that there must be 
a stipulation in the case by all counsel that the retired judge 
could act. In 1951 the section was again amended by unani-
mous vote of both houses of the Legislature. (Assembly 
Daily Journal, May 18, 1951, p. 4501; Senate Daily Journal, 
June 16, 1951, p. 3462.) By that amendment the require-
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ment of a stipulation of counsel was eliminated and a provi-
sion added for compensation to the retired judge while under 
assignment based on the difference between his retirement 
allowance and the compensation of a judge of the court to 
which he is assigned. (Stats. 1951, p. 3694.) 
For a period of 15 years and over, and until the judgment 
in this case in August, 1952, the system of assignment of 
retired judges to try cases in the superior court has been 
in operation without objection. 
Thus, at all times since the enactment of the Judges' Retire-
ment Act in 1937 section 6 thereof has contained the provision 
that a retired judge should be a judicial officer of the state 
and also the provision granting to the Legislature power 
"from time to time" to "change the requirements and con-
ditions for retirement.'' This the Legislature has done in 
the two instances mentioned and the question is whether 
the conditions iu the original enactment and those subse-
quently incorporated in it were within the power of the 
Legislature to enact. If it be concluded that they bear a 
reasonable relation to a system of retirement of judges and 
do not offend any provision of the Constitution they should 
be upheld. It is our conclusion that they are valid from 
both standpoints. 
'rhis type of legislation, both constitutional and statutory, 
is not new in this state. The Public Utilities Commission 
has been established under a constitutional enabling act with 
full power conferred on the Legislature to enact legislation 
even contrary to any other provisions of the Constitution, 
provided it be cognate and germane to the regulation and 
control of public utilities. ( Const., art. XII, § 22; Pacific 
1'el. & 1'el. Co. v. Eshleman, 166 Cal. 640 [137 P. 1119, Ann. 
Cas. 1915C 822, 50 L.R.A.N.S. 652].) Likewise the Indus-
trial Accident Commission has been set up under an enabling 
act whereby the Legislature is expressly vested with plenary 
power ''unlimited by any provision of this Constitution, to 
create, and enforce a complete system of workmen's compen-
sation .... " ( Const., art. XX, § 21; Western Metal Supply 
Co. v. Pillsbury, 172 Cal. 407 [156 P. 491, Ann.Cas. 1917E 
390] .) 
Under the foregoing enabling acts the Legislature has 
enacted laws which, as interpreted by the courts, are con-
trolling, as to the subjects properly legislated upon, over 
other general provisions of the Constitution and general laws. 
So here the Constitution has in general terms conferred 
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upon the Legislature the power to establish a system for 
the retirement of judges. The Legislature has done so and 
has imposed as a condition of retirement that retired judges, 
so long as they receive retirement allowances, shall continue 
to be judicial officers of the state and with their permission 
shall be subject to call for judicial service by assignment 
for that purpose by the chairman of the Judicial Council. 
[2] It would seem to be beyond question that the pro-
vision for the assignment and service of a retired judge in 
accordance with the statute bears a reasonable relationship 
to a system of judges' retirement. It is inherently connected 
with the problems of the administration of justice under which 
the state, in consideration for the retirement allowance, may 
invoke the assistance of the retired personnel of the judicial 
department in emergencies found to exist by the chairman 
of the Judicial Council. Nothing foreign to that purpose 
could have been in contemplation by the Legislature. 
It is recognized that the constitutional grant of power to the 
Legislature to establish the two commissions above referred to 
is much more comprehensive than that contained in section 
22a of article IV, and it is taken for granted that any legisla-
tion adopted under the authority of that section must not be 
inconsistent with other provisions of the Constitution. 
[3] There is no provision of the Constitution which would 
prohibit the Legislature from providing, as it has in section 
6, that so long as he receives a retirement allowance a retired 
judge shall be a judicial officer of the state. Section 1 of 
article VI which provides that the judicial power of the 
state shall be vested in the senate, sitting as a court of 
impeachment, and in the several courts. including the superior 
court, deals with the question of the official entities in which 
the judicial power of the state shall be vested and not ,,·ith 
the personnel of those institutions. And it must be assmnP(l 
that an assigned retired superior court judge is possrssf'rl 
of all of the qualifications otherwise acquired for serviee on 
that court, including the requirement of section 23 of article 
VI of the Constitution that he shall have been aomittro to prne-
tice in this state for at lf'ast five years before becoming a 
superior court judge. 
\Vith that assumption it is observed that here we are dPal-
ing with the status of a superior eourt judge who has retired 
pursuant to the provisions of the statute. [4] fn order to 
retire he must, while in office, file his notice of retirement 
with the Secretary of State as provided by section 1 of the 
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act. (Stats. 1937, p. 2204.) [5] While in retirement he 
has the privilege of maintaining his membership in the State 
Bar of California. .1""s such he is entitled to all of the privi-
leges and immunities and is subject to the duties and obli-
gations of an attorney at law so long as he maintains his 
membership in the State Bar organization. His term of 
office as a judge has expired, or been terminated prior thereto 
by his voluntary act, and the office is vacant. He may go 
and come in all respects as any attorney and counselor at 
law but he has no power as a judicial officer until the hap-
pening of a contingency, namely, his assignment and volun-
tary acceptance thereof as a judge of the superior court in 
and for a designated county by the chairman of the Judicial 
Council. [6] That assignment does not prolong his term 
of office. It merely has the effect of vesting in him the 
powers of a judge of the superior court during the period 
specified in the assignment, as is ordinarily done in the 
case of an assignment by the chairman of the Judicial Council 
of an incumbent superior court judge from one county· to 
another under the authority of section la of article VI of 
the Constitution. [7] It must be taken for granted that 
under the proper exercise of the power of assignment a 
retired judge will not be continued in service indefinitely. 
The term of assignment is necessarily within the wise dis-
cretion of the chairman of the Judicial Council. [8] Upon 
the expiration of the period of his assignment the judge 
resumes his prior status as a retired judge. If he desires 
to exercise the privileges of an attorney during his retire-
ment and while unassigned, he would, of course, be subject 
to the provisions of the State Bar Act, including the require-
ment of the payment of dues. 
[9] It is also observed that section 6 of the Judges' Re-
tirement Act does not offend any provision of the Constitution 
on the ground that an assignment thereunder is an unlawful 
increase in the number of judges of the county to which the 
retired judge is assigned. The Constitution does not limit 
the number of superior court judges in any county. The 
Legislature has full control of the number (two-thirds in 
both houses voting in favor thereof, § 9, art. VI) and sec-
tion 6 of the retirement act is legislative authority for addi-
tional sessions of court for the particular county to which 
the assignment is made ( §§ 6 and 9, art. VI). 
[10] Again, the increase in compensation provided for in 
Mar.1954] PICKENS V. JOHNSON 
[42 C.2d 399; 267 P.2d 801] 
407 
section 6 of the act to be paid to retired judges while under 
assignment is not inconsistent with any provision of the 
Constitution. The compensation to be paid to superior court 
judges is for the Legislature to determine under section 17 
of article VI of the Constitution. 
[11] Section 8 of article VI, providing that the term of 
office of a superior court judge shall be six years, and cases 
such as Martello v. SupM·ior Court, 202 Cal. 400 [261 P. 
476], holding that a judicial officer may not perform a valid 
judicial act after his term has expired, do not set at nought 
the obvious purpose of the assignment provisions of the 
Judges' Retirement Act. In no proper sense is the term 
of a judge extended by his retirement or by his assignment. 
Upon his retirement he can no longer of his own volition 
assume to act as a judge whether he retires at the end of 
his term, as in this case, or in his midterm. It is only upon 
his assignment in accordance with a statute as authorized 
by the Constitution that he has any judicial power whatso-
ever, and since it is correct to say that the assignment has 
a reasonable relationship to the system of retirement with 
no rights in the retired judge to act except under the assign-
ment, there has been no unlawful extension of his term of 
office. 
[12] The fact that under section 6 of the act the retired 
judge while receiving retirement allowance is declared to 
be a judicial officer of the state (but without any power as 
such except while under assignment) should be considered 
as nothing more than making him eligible for assignment. 
It would be unreasonable to conclude that while not under 
assignment he would be subject to the conditions that at-
tach to the status and aetivities of an incumbent judge. 
[13] When assigned he voluntarily assumes the status of 
a regular judge and would necessarily be governed by those 
conditions. For example, when under assignment he could 
not practice law ( Const., art. VI, § 18), and could not be 
absent from the state longer than 60 days ( Const., art. VI, 
§ 9). Others could be noted. While not under assignment 
there is no good reason to say that he would be subject to 
the provisions of the Constitution and law of the state made 
specially applicable to regular incumbent judges. 
As hereinbefore indicated there was no provision in the 
original Judges' Retirement Act of 1937 requiring a stipu-
lation of counsel that the assigned retired judge might act. 
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(Stats. 1937, p. 2206.) In 1941 section 6 of the act was 
amended to provide that, ''Any such retired justice or judge 
may, with his own consent, and upon the stipulation of all 
the counsel in the case or cases to which he is assigned to sit, 
be assigned by the chairman of the Judicial Council to sit 
in any court; and while so assigned shall have all the powers 
of a justice or judge thereof.'' ( Stats. 1941, p. 2938.) In 
1951 this section was again amended by eliminating the 
requirement of a stipulation of counsel before the order of 
assignment could be made. (Stats. 1951, p. 3694.) 
It is again emphasized that we are here dealing with the 
assignment of a retired judge of the superior court to sit 
in a superior court. Such being the case it is urged that, 
notwithstanding the amendment of section 6 in 1951, dispens-
ing with the requirement of a stipulation of counsel, never-
theless such a stipulation as to the assignment of a superior 
court judge is required under the provisions of section 5 
of article VI of the Constitution as amended in 1928. The 
amendment added in that year is as follows: "Upon stipu-
lation of the parties litigant or their attorneys of record a 
cause in the superior court or in a municipal court may be 
tried by a judge pro tempore who must be a member of the 
bar sworn to try the cause, and who shall be empowered to 
act in such capacity in the cause tried before him until the 
final determination thereof. The selection of such judge 
pro tempore shall be subject to the approval and order of 
the court in which said cause is pending and shall also be 
subject to such regulations and orders as may be prescribed 
by the Judicial Council.'' 
[14] It is argued that since section 22 of article I of the 
Constitution provides that: '' 'l'he provisions of this Con-
stitution are mandatory and prohibitory, unless by express 
words they are declared to be otherwise,'' there is no power 
in the Legislature to provide for the assignment of a retired 
superior court judge to act as a judge of such a court except 
by stipulation of counsel, accompanied by an order of the 
superior court approving the selection. 
A sufficient answer to this argument is that the Constitution 
and the statute do not encompass the same subject matter 
and that there is no conflict between them. Section 5 of 
article VI of the Constitution, by its own terms, has to do 
only with the establishment of a court through the medium 
of a pro tempore judge, selected from the membership of 
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the bar by stipulation of counsel to try a particular case, 
and whose selection must be approved by the superior court. 
'l'he chairman of the Judicial Council has nothing to do with 
setting up such a court. On the other hand section 6 of 
the Judges' Hetirement .Act operates to establish a court 
through the medium of a judicial officer of the state and his 
assignment thereto by the chairman of the Judicial Council. 
Where duly assigned under that section such officer obviously 
is not a judge pro tempore selected by stipulation of counsel 
to try a particular case as contemplated by section 5 of article 
VI of the Constitution. The latter section operates inde-
pendently of the retirement act. Neither controls the other. 
·when a retired judge is duly assigned under the retirement 
act he is a regular judge of the superior court whose status 
as such is created by the Legislature pursuant to constitu-
tional authority. Section 5 of article VI is therefore not 
controlling. It necessarily follows that under the retirement 
statute no stipulation of counsel is required as a prerequisite 
to the assignment of a retired superior court judge to preside 
as a judge of the superior court in any county in the state. 
It may not be assumed that the power of assignment con-
ferred by section 6 of the statute will be improvidently exer-
cised. If perchance it should be the Legislature has complete 
authority to deal with the subject by appropriate legislation 
even to the extent of withdrawing the power altogether. 
[15] By section la of article VI (subd. 6) of the Consti-
tution the duty is enjoined upon the chairman of the Judicial 
Council to seek to expedite the judicial business of the state, 
to equalize the work of the judges, and to provide for the 
assignment of incumbent judges from one county to another 
under certain conditions. None of the conditions specified 
in that section would prohibit the assignment here under 
consideration. 
[1'6] Whether as a matter of policy the system of assign-
ment of retired judges should be put into effect is for the 
people of the state to determine through the Constitution or 
by the Legislature. That policy has been declared by both, 
by the Constitution by reasonable implication and by the 
I-1egislature in the unmistakable and definite terms of section 
6 of the retirement act. 'fhe public policy so reflected is of 
eonsiderable public concern. It is not a matter which is 
subject to judicial control where it has been plainly declared 
by legislative authority. A plan for the continued service 
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of federal judges has been in effect for many years. (28 
U.S.C.A. § 294 [:formerly § 375a] ; Booth v. United States, 
291 U.S. 339 [54 S.Ct. 379, 78 L.Ed. 836] ; United States v. 
Moore, 101 F.2d 56, cert.den., 306 U.S. 664 [59 S.Ct. 788, 
83 L.Ed. 1060] .) The purpose of such a plan would seem 
to be to make available to the judicial department the ex-
perience, aptitude and capabilities of retired judges who, 
with their consent, may be called upon for assistance in the 
administration of justice. Such a plan is highly desirable 
not only in particular cases but also when congestion in 
judicial business in a particular locality has become critical, 
and oftentimes intolerable. 
The chairman of the Judicial Council is the logical consti-
tutional officer in whom to vest the power of assignment. 
It is one of his functions to marshal the judicial manpower 
o£ the state by assignment and transfer of judges to facilitate 
the dispatch of judicial business. No other person is in better 
or as good a position as he to determine the desirability and 
need for such assistance. 
[17] From the foregoing it is concluded that while the 
trial judge in these cases was acting under the assignment 
he was acting as a judge de jure. There is no question but 
that if he were not, the status of a judge de facto attached 
to his action. The office to which he was assigned was a 
de jure office. By acting under regular assignment under 
a statute authorizing it he was acting under color o£ authority 
as provided by law. His conduct in trying the cases and 
rendering judgment therein cannot here be questioned. 
(People v. J{empley, 205 Cal. 441 [271 P. 478], and cases 
there cited.) But the fact that those judgments may not 
be attacked for disqualification of the trial judge because 
he acted at least as a judge de facto is not enough. The 
question whether he acted as a de jure judge is essential 
to the proper disposition of this case especially for the proper 
functioning of the retirement system and the regularity of 
the action of assigned judges thereunder. 
Since it is determined that the judgments herein may 
not be assailed on the ground that the trial judge was without 
power to act under the assignment, we turn to the merits 
of the appeal. From the record it appears that the Pickens 
were the owners of a business (including an on-sale liquor 
license) and equipment and the property on which it was 
located. In 1948, the parties made a conditional contract 
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of sale in which the Pickens were the sellers of the business 
and personal property used therewith for the sum of $10,000 
to be paid in stated installments, and of which $5,000 was 
paid. At the same time, the Pickens leased by written lease 
the real property on which the business was located for a 
five-year term commencing January 5, 1948, at a monthly 
rental of $225, the first and last month of which were paid 
in advance. The Johnsons took possession of the property 
under the agreements and they retained possession until 
September 20, 1949. 
In the course of operating the business, the Johnsons in-
curred obligations to third persons for which an action was 
commenced against them in the municipal court. An attach-
ment was issued in that action against ''goods, wares and 
merchandise" of the Johnsons located on the leased property. 
On September 14, 1949, the marshal levied the attachment 
on such ''goods, wares and merchandise'' by posting notice 
on the premises where located and padlocking the doors of 
the building. Hunter, an employee of the Johnsons, was 
then in charge of the business. He operated the bar at the 
business on September 15th under the marshal's direction. 
He left the premises on September 19th and when he returned 
on the 20th, the marshal's padlocks had been replaced by 
other padlocks, and the Pickens were in possession, having 
entered on that day, removing the marshal's padlocks. At 
that time, all sums payable under the lease and agreement 
had been paid by the Johnsons according to the instruments. 
The rent had been paid to and including October 10, 1949, 
and on that date the J ohnsons' tender of the rent for the 
ensuing month was refused by the Pickens. Other factors 
show that the Pickens asserted and held possession of the 
premises to the exclusion of the J ohnsons. 
In the first of the two consolidated actions, the Pickens', 
plaintiffs', basic claims were that the Johnsons had violated the 
lease by suffering the attachment to be levied and incurring 
the obligations on which the attachment was based in their 
name and on their credit; that hence the lease was breached 
and it and the agreement were no longer in effect and they 
were entitled to regain possession of the premises and business. 
In the second action, the ,J ohnsons, plaintiffs, claimed dam-
ages from the Pickens for ousting and excluding them from 
possession of the premises and business, asserting no breach 
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of the lease or agreement and ref;ting their claim on those 
instrnments. 
'l'hc~ i'Ollrt t"onnd that thPl'P had been no br<'ach of the 
lPasn or agreemnnt; that the merchandise was not bought 
in the Pickrns' name or on their credit; that the levy of 
the attachment did not breach the lease; that the Pickens 
ousted and excluded the J ohnsons from possession without 
right; that the J ohnsons had not abandoned the premises 
or their rights under the lease ; and that the Pickens were 
liable in damages to the J ohnsons for their conduct. 
The actions were previously tried resulting in a judgment 
for the Pickens, and the J ohnsons were ordered to transfer 
the liquor license to the Pickens. That was done and in the 
second trial $4,500 of the damages awarded to the John-
sons was the found value of the liquor license. An appeal 
was taken from the judgment after the :first. trial, the main 
grounds being insufficiency of the evidence to support it. 
'l'he judgment was reversed on that ground and several mat-
ters were determined. (Pickens v. Johnson, 107 Cal.App.2d 
778 [238 P.2d 40].) The Pickens based their claim of a 
violation of the lease on a clause in which the J ohnsons, 
lessees, agreed not to permit any liens to be :filed against 
the premises, asserting the levy of the attachment as a viola-
tion, and further invoked a clause of the lease which gave 
them right of reentry for breach. The District Court of 
Appeal held that there vvas no breach becallSe the attachment 
was of merchandise, rather than of premises. It was also 
determined that under the evidence the ,Johnsons did not 
incur the obligations upon which the attachment was based 
in the Pickens' name or credit and the J ohnsons had not 
abandoned the premises, their lease, or the agreement. 
The Pickens assert on this appeal that they were justified 
in seizing possession of the premises and taking the liquor 
license from the wall on the premises, or otherwise phrased, 
the findings of the court to the contrary are not supported 
by the evidence. They assert that the Johnsons abandoned 
the premises and that an improper measnre of damages was 
applied. 
\Ve have heretofore Reen that it was settled by the former 
appeal (P1:ckens v . .Johnson, snpra, 107 Cal.App.2d 778) that 
there was no breach of the lease by reason of the levy of 
the attachment and hence the Pickens had no right to reenter 
or retain possession of the premises and merchandise on that 
ground. 
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The Pickens concede that there is a conflict in the evidence 
on the question of abandonment of the lease and agreement 
by the ,J ohnsons and the court in its findings resolved that 
conflict against them. Thus there is no occasion to discuss 
the evidence on the subject. 
For the first time the Pickens now contend that the busi-
ness and the premises were a part of a joint enterprise 
between them and the Johnsons and therefore they had the 
right to enter and retain possession of the premises and 
merchandise. They point to evidence that the liquor license 
was issued in the J ohnsons' and their names jointly and that 
they were parties defendant in the municipal court action and 
judgment was then given against them as well as the Johnsons. 
No such proposition was asserted in any of the pleadings or 
at any other ti1r~e. Moreover, the lease and agreement 
squarely refute it. They created a landlord-tenant relation 
with reference to the premises and the liquor license was 
one of the things sold by the agreement to the ,J ohnsons. 
At no time prior to their entry into possession in September 
did they make any such claim. 
The Pickens contend they had a right to enter to 
obtain the liquor license in order to turn it over to the Board 
of Equalization as the law required them to do to protect 
their interest because the failure to operate the business 
·would forfeit the license and that is the reason they entered. 
Assuming such was the case it would not authorize them to 
foreibly seize possession of the premises and merchandise 
and retain them to the exclusion of the J ohnsons. There is 
evidence which negatives that as the purpose of their entry. 
·while there is some conflict, the evidence shows that the 
Pickens broke the padlocks which had been placed on the 
door by the marshal and put their own locks on. The Pickens 
thereupon took possession of the premises. They removed 
some merchandise therefrom and took down decorations and 
rmovated it. After the attachment was levied on September 
14, 1949, the premises were open with a keeper in charge 
for two days and then padlocked. The Pickens told the 
,Johnsons' bartender who was residing at the premises to 
remove his personal articler-;. The ~Tohnsons had made ar-
rangements with a Mrs. Sprouse to borrow the money to 
discharge the attachment but when she found out the Pickens 
were in possession she refused to advance it. Mrs. Johnson 
temlerecl the rent due under the lease on October 10, 1949, 
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to the Pickens and demanded possession of the premises; 
both were refused. Similar tenders and demands were made 
on November lOth. Also, the Pickens refused to permit the 
,J ohnsons to remove their personal belongings. The Pickens 
posted a notice dated September 14, 1949, on the premises 
declaring that because of the attachment the J ohnsons had 
broken the lease and agreement (which as we have seen was 
not true) and unless the attachment was released in three 
days the J ohnsons would lose all rights under the lease and 
agreement. Finally, the Pickens commenced their action on 
October 28, 1949, in which they declared that the lease and 
agreement were broken and they took possession of the prop-
erty on September 20, 1949, and requested the court to 
declare that the J ohnsons had no right to the property. 
'fhere is, therefore, sufficient evidence to show an ouster 
by the Pickens of the Johnsons from the premises, an exclu-
sion of the ,J ohnsons from possession and a forcible entry by 
the Pickens, all contrary to the J ohnsons' rights under the 
lease and agreement. 
[18] The damages of $19,900 awarded the Johnsons con-
sisted of $4,500 for the liquor license and $15,400 for the 
loss of possession of the premises in violation of the lease. 
It was found that the value of the use of the premises which 
is the rental value from September 20, 1949, to January 5, 
1953, the end of the lease term, was $400 per month. Evi-
dently the court concluded that this ran from October 21, 
1949. The rental under the lease was $225 per month but 
no claim is made that such amount should be deducted from 
the $400 use value. 'rhe Pickens assert that the only evidence 
of the use value was based on the assumption that the liquor 
license would be used on the premises and that to permit 
recovery of such a use value and also the value of the liquor 
license is to allow two amounts of damages for the same thing. 
There is evidence that the net income from the business 
was over $7,000 for the 12-month period prior to the unlawful 
entry and there was evidence that the liquor license alone 
was worth $10,000. It will be recalled that the lease called 
for a rental of $225 per month and independent of that the 
price of the equipment including the license in the agreement 
was $10,000. It is true that the lease and agreement should 
be read together, and it was contemplated· that the license 
be used on the leased premises, but a separate price was 
fixed for the use of the premises (the lease) and the sale 
of the license and equipment under the agreement. Taking 
Mar. 1954] PICKENS V. JOHNSON 
[42 C.2d 399; 267 P.2d 801] 
415 
into consideration the net profit from the business together 
with the rental price stated in the lease, the court could have 
properly concluded, as it did, that the value of the use of 
the premises was $400 per month. 
The judgments are affirmed. 
Edmonds, J., Traynor, J., Spence, J., and Dooling, J. pro 
tern., ;c, concurred. 
Dooling, J. pro tern., sat in place of the Chief Justice, who 
deemed himself disqualified. 
CARTER, J., Concurring and Dissenting.-! concur in 
the judgment on the ground that J. 0. Moncur was a de facto 
judge and that no error was committed; hence the judgment 
should be affirmed. But I cannot agree with the holding of 
the majority that a retired justice or judge may be a de jure 
justice or judge, or that the Judges' Retirement Act (Stats. 
1937, p. 2204, as amended) is constitutional insofar as it 
purports to authorize a justice or judge whose term of office 
has expired to act in a judicial capacity without, at least, 
the consent of the parties. 
1'he fallacy of the majority holding in this respect is ap-
parent. In effect the majority holds that section 22a of 
article IV of the Constitution which empowers the Legisla-
ture to provide for retirement salaries for state employees 
modifies or repeals all provisions of the Constitution relating 
to the selection, terms of office and extrajudicial activities of 
justices or judges. (See Cal. Const., art IV, §§ 18 and 20; 
art. VI, §§ 3, 8, 9, 10, lOa, 18 and 26.) The majority holding 
also nullifies section 1 of article III of the Constitution 
providing for the separation of the powers of the state 
government. 
Under the majority holding, the Legislature may, pur-
suant to section 22a of article IV, extend the term of office 
of a superior court judge beyond a period of six years fixed 
by article VI, section 8, of the Constitution and may extend 
the term of office of a member of the Supreme Court or 
District Court of Appeal beyond the 12-year period fixed 
by article VI, sections 3 and 4a, of the Constitution. This 
is obvious because, under this holding a justice or judge 
whose term of office has expired, is still a justice or judge 
although he is entitled to practice law in violation of article 
VI, section 18, of the Constitution. The chairman of the 
*Assigned by Acting Chairman of Judicial Council. 
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.Judicial Council by some magic may assign this practicing 
lawyer-jnsticc or judge to the position of a de jure justice 
or judge fol' snch pt~riod as such chairman and such lawyer-
justiee or judge may decide between themselves. ff a client 
should consult sueh a lawyer- justice or judge while he is 
under assignment, I prPsume the latter would say: "While 
I was a lawyer and entitled to practice law before this assign-
ment, I am now a justice or judge and not entitled to 
practice law during this assignment, but when I finish this 
assignment I will again be a lawyer entitled to practice law, 
and I can then act as your lawyer.'' ·while under such 
assignment and acting as such justice or judge he is not 
permitted to give legal advice, accept employment or com-
pensation for any service performed as a lawyer. After the 
assignment is ended, he resumes the practice of law until 
the next assignment, or he may seek a public office or fill 
some public position in violation of article IV, section 20, 
and article VI, section 18, of the Constitution. He may 
decide to take a journey out of the state but if he is out 
of the state for a period of longer than 60 days he violates 
article VI, section 9, of the Constitution. Suppose a retired 
justice or judge should be elected a district attorney, a city 
attorney, a member of the Legislature, or some other public 
office. Obviously under settled principles of constitutional 
law he would not be eligible for assignment to a de jure 
judicial position. Would this mean that he would lose his 
retirement salary as he would not be available to accept 
an assignment to a judicial position by the chairman of the 
Judicial Council? We would then have the unique situa-
tion that some retired justices or judges would be eligible 
for assignment and others would not. The assignment by 
the chairman of the Judicial Council of such a lawyer-justice 
or judge may be for one day or one year or 10 years for 
service upon any court which such chairman and such retired 
lawyer-justice or judge may agree upon. All this without 
popular sanction and in direct violation of constitutional 
mandates. Just the chairman of the Judicial Council and 
this lawyer-justicr, or judge determine when he is a lawyer 
and when he is a judge and where he will sit when he is a 
judge. When he is a lawyer he is subject to the provisions 
of the State Bar Act and must pay his State Bar dues. When 
he is a justice or judge he is subject to the above cited 
constitutional provisions with respect to his extrajudicial 
activities. He may be a lawyer one day and justice or judge 
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the next. As a lawyer he is an advocate----a partisan-a 
(;onfidential adviser of his clients. As a ;jnf1ge he is required 
to weigh and consider the evidence and the law and render 
a fair and impartial decision. As a justice or judge he has 
no fixed term of office except the period of assignment which 
may or may not be renewed at the discretion of the chairman 
of the Judicial Council. In fact, he does not know from 
one day to another whether he is to be a judge or a lawyer. 
In short, he must have a dual or split personality to qualify 
for these dual positions overnight. 
In describing the type of judge created by section 6 of 
the Judges' Retirement Act the majority opinion states : 
"On the other hand section 6 of the Judges' Retirement Act 
operates to establish a court through the medium of a judicial 
officer of the state and his assignment thereto by the chairman 
of the Judicial Council. Where duly assigned under that 
section such officer obviously is not a judge pro tempore 
selected by stipulation of counsel to try a particular case 
as contemplated by section 5 of article VI of the Constitution. 
'l'he latter section operates independently of the retirement 
act. Neither controls the other. When a retired judge is 
duly assigned under the retirement act he is a regular judge 
of the superior court whose status as such is created by the 
Legislature pursuant to constitutional authority. Section 5 
of article VI is therefore not controlling. It necessarily fol-
lows that under the retirement statute no stipulation of 
counsel is required as a prerequisite to the assignment of a 
retired superior court judge to preside as a judge of the 
superior court in any county in the state.'' 
It is obvious from a reading of the foregoing excerpt from 
the majority opinion that the majority reasons from a false 
premise; that is, the majority assumes that a retired justice 
or judge whose term of office has expired is "a judicial officer 
of the state.'' This assumption is made notwithstanding the 
previous statement in said opinion as follows: "In no proper 
sense is the term of a judge extended by his retirement or 
by his assignment. Upon his retirement he can no longer 
of his own volition assume to act as a judge whether he 
retires at the end of his term, as in this case, or in his mid-
term .... ·while not under assignment there is no good 
reason to say that he would be subject to the provisions of 
the Constitution and law of the state made specially appli-
cable to regular incumbent judges.'' In other words, when 
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not under assignment, the retired justice or judge is returned 
to the status of a lawyer-a member of the State Bar, if he 
pays his dues, and is entitled to practice law. How, may 
I ask, is his status any different from that of any other lawyer 
or member of the Bar, and what magic has transformed him 
from a lawyer or member of the Bar into ''a judicial officer 
of the state?" Finally, can it be said that a person may have 
the status of both a member of the entitled to practice 
law, and that of "a judicial officer of the state," at one and 
the same time? To so hold is to overrule State Bar of Cali-
fornia v. Superior Court, 207 Cal. 323 [278 P. 432], where 
it was held by a unanimous court as follows (p. 340): "The 
duly elected and qualified judges of the courts of record 
in this state who were such at the time said act became 
effective and who have since become and are such judicial 
officers were and are not, under the inhibition of section 22 
of article VI of the state constitution, entitled to practice 
law in this state during their and each of their continuance 
in office, and hence under the express provisions of said State 
Bar Act have not become and during said period are not 
members of 'l'he State Bar of California, and hence are not 
subject to the jurisdiction, control and processes conferred 
upon said corporation and the governing board or other officers 
thereof by the scope and provisions of said act.'' 
The majority opinion also states: "It may not be assumed 
that the power of assignment conferred by section 6 of the 
statute will be improvidently exercised. If perchance it 
should be the Legislature has complete authority to deal with 
the subject by appropriate legislation even to the extent of 
withdrawing the power altogether.'' 
This pronouncement strikes a lethal blow at section 1, ar-
ticle III, of the Constitution known as the separation of powers 
mandate. Under the majority holding the Legislature, in 
violation of this mandate, may say to retired justices or 
judges whose terms of office have expired: "You must con-
tinue to serve as justices or judges whenever and wherever 
we (the Legislature) direct or yon may not serve at all-
you may or you may not practice law or hold other positions-
in other words, you retired justices and judges are under 
our control and you must obey our mandates.'' Obviously, 
if the Legislature may provide that retired justices or judges 
may be assigned to a judicial position with their consent, 
it may also provide that they must serve in such judicial 
positions without their consent and may provide sanctions 
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for their failure to so serve. rrhis may not set wen with 
even some retired Supreme and appellate court justices who 
may desire to engage in extrajudicial activities. They may 
then remember the trite saying with mixed metaphors : 
"'When chickens come home to roost it's a horse of another 
color." 
Another serious result which may flow from the majority 
holding in this case is that a justice or judge eligible for 
retirement under the Judges' Retirement Act may be de-
feated at an election to succeed himself and then retire under 
the act before his term expires. Under the majority holding 
here such justice or judge may be assigned by the chairman 
of the Judicial Council to sit as a justice or judge in any 
court in which he may be eligible to sit under the act and 
thus he may continue to function as a justice or judge in-
definitely and thereby thwart the will of the electors. I can 
envision a situation such as this arising in the smaller coun-
ties of the state which have only one or two judges and 
where the defeated retired judge may be so unpopular that 
he has lost the confidence and respect of a large segment 
of the population who constitute his constituents. Yet the 
chairman of the Judicial Council with the consent of such 
retired judge could foist him onto the people of that county 
as a judge of the superior court for an indefinite period by 
the power of assignment which the majority now hold the 
chairman of the Judicial Council possesses. I believe there 
can be no refutation of the statement that when the people 
of this state adopted section 22a of article IV of the Consti-
tution at the general election in 1930 not a single soul who 
voted :for this amendment ever contemplated the far-reaching 
consequences of their act as now construed by a majority of 
this court. 
The majority refers to section 5, article VI, of the Con-
stitution which authorizes the appointment of a judge pro 
tempore by stipulation of the parties approved by a judge 
of the superior court. While this provision has been in the 
Constitution in one form or another since 1879 its use has 
been very limited. In my 26 years of law practice, I never 
knew of it being used, and in the more than 14 years that 
l have been a member of this court, I do not recall a 
Bingle case coming before this court which had been heard 
and decided by a judge pro tempore selected under this 
provision of the Constitution. I mention this only to call 
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attention to the fact that it must be the feeling of lawyers 
and litigants alike that they prefer to have their controversies 
settled by judges selected in accordance with the constitutional 
provisions hereinabove cited, and if I am not mistaken the 
Bar of this state will revolt against the holding of this court 
which places it within the power of the chairman of the 
Judicial Counsel and a retired justice or judge to create 
the judicial tribunal which has the power to determine the 
rights of the litigants in controversies which may involve 
their life, liberty, or property in violation of the constitutional 
mandates which I have heretofore cited. 
Much is said in the majority opinion in regard to the 
desirability of the legislation contained in section 6 of the 
Judges' Retirement Act. In this respect the majority opinion 
states : ''The purpose of such a plan would seem to be to 
make available to the judicial department the experience, 
aptitude and capabilities of retired judges who, with their 
consent, may be called upon for assistance in the adminis-
tration of justiee. Sueh a plan is highly desirable not only 
in partieular cases but also when eongestion in judicial busi-
ness in a particular loeality has beeome critieal, and often-
times intolerable." Assuming, without conceding, the factual 
correctness of the foregoing statement, I have grave doubt 
as to its wisdom even though it were possible by any reason-
able or logical analysis to extend the provisions of section 
22a of article IV of the Constitution to authorize the adoption 
of such a plan. While it is no doubt true that some retired 
justices or judges may be well qualified to continue func-
tioning in a judicial capacity, it is likewise true that some 
are not. vVe certainly have the right to assume that when 
a judge voluntarily retires, he desires to be relieved of the 
duties of his judicial office, as retirement means just that. 
The Legislature has the power under the Constitution to create 
a sufficient number of superior court judgeships to enable 
our superior courts to expeditiously handle all legal matters 
coming before our courts, and it seems to me much more 
appropriate for the Legislature to exercise this power than 
to resort to the hybrid type of legislation contained in 
section 6 of the Judges' Retirement Act. 
In this case there is no question that Moncur, the judge 
who purported to act as such in these consolidated cases, was 
not a legal judge. The term of office for which he had been 
elected had expired. He did not run for office again but 
on the contrary retired as he was authorized to do under 
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the retirement act. A successor had been chosen for his 
office, a superior court judge in Plumas County. It is true 
l1e was regularly to act as a judge in these cases 
by the chairman of the ,Judicial Cormcil but he was not quali-
fied for that position. 
There are several constitutional obstacles to his being a 
de jure judge or to the power of the Legislature under the 
retirement act or otherwise to authorize such procedure. 
The Constitution requires that judges of superior courts 
shall be elected by the voters of the county in which is situ-
ated the superior court for which the judge is to be chosen 
(Cal. Const., art. VI, § 6), but that in case of a vacancy 
in the effice, the Governor shall appoint a person to hold 
the office until the commencement of the term of a person 
elected to fill the vacancy which shall be done at the general 
election next after the first day in ,January after the vacancy 
occurs, and his term (six years) shall commence on the first 
Monday of Jan nary after the first day of January next suc-
ceeding his election. The term of office is six years. (Cal. 
Const., art. VI, § 8.) Under these provisions it has been 
held that a purported judicial act done by a judge after 
his term of office has expired has no force or effect. (Martello 
v. Superior Co~td, 202 Cal. 400 [261 P. 476] ; Connolly v. 
Ashworth, 98 Cal. 205 [33 P. 601 ; Mace v. O'Reilley, 70 Cal. 
231 [11 P. 721]; B1·oder v. Conklin, 98 Cal. 360 [33 P. 211]; 
People v. Ruef, 14 Cal.App. 576, 630 [114 P. 48, 54].) The 
J_~egislature cannot extend the term of a judge fixed by the 
Constitution (People v. Campbell, 138 Cal. 11, 16 [70 P. 
918] ; People v. Markham, 104 Cal. 232, 235 [37 P. 918]) 
nor confer ?tpon him judicial power after his term has ex-
p1:red, where the Constitution fixes his term of office and 
mode of selection. (Hallam v. Tillinghast, 19 Wash. 20 [52 
P. 329].) 
From the above constitutional provision and authorities 
it is clear that Moncur was not a judge when the cases were 
tried and any judicial act done by him was ineffective. He 
had been elected a superior judge but his term had expired 
on the day he retired and he was not reelected; his successor 
had previously been elected and was discharging the duties 
of that office. Moncur did not hold an appointment by the 
Governor to fill a vacancy. That is, he was in no different 
position than a judge who did not run for reelection or did 
run and was defeated; his term had expired and his successor 
was occupying the position. Hence if there are no other 
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provisions justifying a different result, section 6 of the 
Judges' Retirement which retired judges to 
serve as judges after retirement, at least without the stipula-
tion of the parties, is invalid. 
Moreover, the effect of permitting the Legislature to author-
ize judges who are not judges (retired judges to act as such 
[the retirement act] ) violates the fundamental premise of 
our Constitution that the legislative, judicial and executive 
departments of our state government shall be separate. (Cal. 
Const., art. III, § 1.) If the Legislature may at its sole 
discretion thwart the provisions in the Constitution for the 
judiciary then there is no longer any true separation of 
power. Section 6 of the retirement act does just that, because 
it empowers the chairman of the Judicial Council to create 
offices of superior court judges where none may exist under 
the Constitution and in a manner contrary to it. 
To overcome the positive constitutional provisions fixing 
the term of office and mode of selection of superior court 
judges, the majority opinion proceeds on the theory that the 
constitutional provisions authorizing the Legislature to estab-
lish a retirement system (Cal. Const., art. IV,§ 22a) are para-
mount to the former provisions and that the Legislature may 
enact measures contrary to them. It stresses the constitutional 
authority of the chairman of the Judicial Council to assign 
judges from one area to another, and a retired judge is not 
a judge until after he has been assigned to serve by the 
chairman and then only during the assignment. 
In reaching that result an analogy is sought to be drawn 
between the powers granted by the Constitution to the Public 
Utilities Commission and Industrial Accident Commission. 
First, with reference to the assignment authority provision, 
it is crystal clear that that provision does not purport to 
repeal the requirement that judges be elected for a fixed 
term ; in case of vacancy and before election the Governor 
must make an appointment, not the chairman of the Judicial 
Council. Under the Judicial Council provision it will be 
noted that ''any judge'' may be assigned, but in order to 
derive authority therefrom to assign a retired judge, it would 
be necessary to conclude that the words mean any person, 
whether or not he is still a judge in the proper legal sense 
that he has been elected or appointed under the constitutional 
provisions above discussed, and his term has not expired. To 
so construe those words is out of harmony with the rule 
announced in Fay v. District Court of Appeal, 200 Cal. 522, 
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536 [254 P. 896], in holding that amendment to the Con-
stitution with reference to judges pro tempore did not mean 
that the entire judicial personnel of a District Court of 
Appeal could consist of pro tempore judges. In Edler v. 
Hollopeter, 214 Cal. 427 [6 P.2d 245], it was held that under 
the Judicial Council amendment an inferior court judge 
could be assigned to a higher court but he must meet the 
qualifications of the higher judicial position (admission to 
practice for five years to his election). If that is 
necessary it would follow that he must also satisfy the quali-
fications for the position of judge, that is, holding office by 
election or appointment before expiration of his term. And 
it has been held that the term "judge" does not apply to 
a person whose term of office has expired. (In re Wheelock's 
Will, 205 App.Div. 654 [200 N.Y.S. 157] .) 
It is unreasonable to believe that the framers of the Judicial 
Council provision or the people in adopting it, intended 
that the chairman of the council be given such broad authority 
by the Constitution that he could select a person for a judicial 
assignment, who had never been a judge, or who had been 
one, and was defeated for reelection years before or did not 
run for reelection. I would hold, therefore, that the Judicia] 
Council provision in the Constitution did not confer authority 
on the chairman to assign as judges other than those who 
were duly elected, qualified and acting and whose term has 
not expired. 
In the same connection the majority opinion makes the 
point that retired judges are judicial officers only when they 
are under assignment by the chairman of the Judicial Council; 
that at all other times they are lawyers with no official posi-
tion. Even if that is true, it furnishes no ground for creating 
a "temporary" judge who has not been elected as required 
by the Constitution, and in any event it is contrary to reason 
and logic. In speaking of retired federal judges, the United 
States Supreme Court has this to say: ''By retiring pursuant 
to the statute a judge does not relinquish his office. The 
language is that he may retire from regular active service. 
The purpose is, however, that he shall continue, so far as his 
age and his health permit, to perform judicial service, and it 
is common knowledge that retired judges have, in fact, dis-
charged a large measure of the duties which would be incum-
bent on them, if still in regular active service. It is scarcely 
necessary to say that a ret·ired jttdge's judicial acts would be 
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illegal unless he who performed them held the office of judge. 
It is a contradiction in terms to assert that one who has 
retired in accordance with the statute may continue to func-
tion as a federal and not hold the office of a judge. 
The Act does not and, indeed, could not, endue him with a 
new office, different from, but embracing the duties of the 
office of judge. He does not surrender his commission, but 
continues to act under it.'' (Emphasis added; Booth v. 
United States, 291 U.S. :339, :350 [54 S.Ct. 379, 78 L.Ed. 
836] .) 
The constitutional retirement provision does not authorize 
the use of retired judges in a judicial capacity or sanction 
legislative authority therefor in the face of the constitutional 
provision requiring election and fixing terms of office for 
judges. 'l'o hold as does the majority would mean that the 
retirement provision repealed by implication the require-
ment of eleCtion of judges, a drastic conclusion which could 
not have been contemplated by the voters in authorizing a 
retirement system. 
Serious consequences may flow from the holding of the 
majority in this case. Similarly the r~egislature could author-
ize the selection and appointment of a retired but defeated 
legislator to fill a vacancy in the Legislature or to serve while 
the incumbent legislator ·was incapacitated. The same would 
be true of a retired governor. I cannot believe that the con-
stitutional provision for a retirement system was intended 
to authorize any sneh a far-reaching and drastic contailment 
of the other provisions in the Constitution, indeed in our 
whole system of state government. It is no doubt true that 
the retirement authorization includes the right to exact fur-
ther service from the retiree as far as he is concerned, but 
when we consider the right of the people as guaranteed by 
the Constitution to have their officers, judicial, legislative 
and executive, elected by them and serve only for a fixed term, 
it is another matter. llequiring that retired judges perform 
services after retirement does not carry the right to impose 
such judges on the people contrary to the election and term 
of office provisions of the Constitution. 'l'he matter may 
be simply solved by reqniring the consent of the parties to 
the sitting of a retired jmlge as was done by the retirement 
act befor(• its amem1ment in 1951. 'l'he pertinent reasoning 
in this situation is stated in Pay v. District Court of Appeal, 
s~tpra, 200 Cal. 522, 586, where the court l1eld that the amend-
ments to the Constitution providing for pro tempore judges 
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to sit on the District Court of Appeal did not mean that the 
entire judicial personnel of a District Court of Appeal could 
eonsist of pro tempore judges for: "To so interpret these pro-
visions iu said amendments, evidently intended to afford tem-
porary and emergency relief, would be to encourage the 
violation of a very vital principle of popular government 
which is none other than that of the right of the people of 
a commonwealth to have their essential rights, liberties, and 
interests in respect to person and property heard and de-
termined by courts of last resort, the constituent membership 
of which is composed of public servants of their own selection. 
That the people might transfer the direct exercise of this 
selection to those whom they may have chosen to administer 
the functions of our representative scheme of government is 
undoubted, but the text of such transfer, whether embodied 
in a constitution or a statute, should be plain and unam-
biguous.'' The reasoning of the majority opinion is squarely 
contrary to the Fay case. 
'l'he analogy claimed by the majority between the retire-
ment provision and other provisions in the Constitution which 
are expressly made paramount to other constitutional require-
ments does not exist. The retirement provision not only 
does not contain such words of supremacy, but in order to 
reach the majority's result we have to read the retirement 
provision as if it does have such words, and then take the 
further step of implying that authorization for a retire-
ment system includes the right of the Legislature to wipe 
ont the constitutional provisions as to election and term of 
office of both superior judges and justices of the Supreme 
Court and District Courts of Appeal. 
In summary, the Constitution :fixes the term of office of 
justices of the Supreme Court and District Courts of Appeal 
and superior court judges. The Legislature has no power to 
extend such terms. Under no reasonable construction can 
it be said that such power is granted by the provisions of 
section 22a of article IV of the Constitution. In fact, the 
antithesis of such construction is indicated. The following 
conclusions are inescapable: ( 1) That by accepting retire-
ment the justice or judge has decided to withdraw from thr 
position held by him and cease rendering service of a judicial 
nature; ( 2) during retirement the justice or judge is restored 
to his status as a member of the Bar and entitled to practicP 
law which a justice or judge may not do while acting in the 
capacity of a judicial officer of the state; (3) tltat his posi-
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tion as a justice or judge will be filled by a successor in a 
manner provided for in the Constitution; ( 4) that he is en-
titled to his retirement salary as a part of the compensation 
earned by him for services already rendered and should not 
be required to render services in the same capacity after 
retirement; (5) that to do so would be discriminatory and 
unfair to those who are capable, because tho~e who are in-
capable of rendering services will receive their retirement 
salaries without being required to render services after re-
tirement; (6) that the chairman of the Judicial Council has 
no constitutional power or authority to create judicial posi-
tions and select justices or judges to fill them or change the 
status of a member of the Bar to that of a justice or judge, 
and the Legislature cannot constitutionally confer such power 
in view of the constitutional provisions hereinabove cited 
which expressly provide for the method of selection and term 
of office of such justices or judges; (7) that the holding of 
the majority in this case strikes a lethal blow against our 
republican form of government and is destructive of the 
democratic processes set up in our Constitution for the selec-
tion of judges; ( 8) and that even if this drastic change in our 
form of government were dictated by compellin17 expediency, 
I could not accept it, because it is contrary to one of the 
basic concepts of popular government declared in the Con-
stitution of California-that the people by popular vote shall 
have the right to determine the manner in which their public 
officers shall be selected and the term of office of such officials. 
I hold, therefore, that the provision in the Judges' Retire-
ment Act, supra, authorizing the assignment of retired judges 
to conduct judicial business without the consent of the parties 
is unconstitutional. 
The Johnsons assert, however, that Moncur was a de facto 
judge and hence the judgments are valid. The Pickens reply 
that there cannot be a de facto judge unless there is a de jure 
court or office of judge; that there was no de jure office or 
court here and thus Moncur could not be a de facto judge. 
It has been stated, and said to be the majority rule, that 
there cannot be a de facto officer where there is no de jure 
office or, as to judges, there can be no de facto judge where 
there is no de jure court. (People v. Hecht, 105 Cal. 621, 
629 [38 P. 941, 45 Am.St.Rep. 96, 27 L.R.A. 203], dictum; 
Oakland Pav. Co. v. Donovan, 19 Cal.App. 488, 494 [126 P. 
388], dictum; Malaley v. City of Marysville, 37 Cal.App. 
638, 640 [174 P. 367], dictum; Kitts v. Superior Court, 5 Cal. 
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App. 462, 468 [90 P. 977], dictum; People v. Toal, 85 Cal. 
333, 338 [24 P. 603] ; Ex parte Giambonini, 117 Cal. 573 
[49 P. 732]; Buck v. City of Eureka, 109 Cal. 504, 512 [30 
L.R.A. 409, 42 P. 243] ; see cases from other jurisdictions 
collected, 99 A.L.R. 294.) That rule has received sharp criti-
cism mainly for the reason that the public policy underlying 
the de facto officer doctrine applies with equal force whether 
or not there is a de jure office. (See 2 So.Cal.L.Rev. 236, 
243; 9 ibid. 189, 206; 1 Vanderbilt L.Rev. 651; 46 1\'Iich.L.Rev. 
439; 13 Minn.L.Rev. 439; 29 ibid. 36; 86 U.Pa.L.Rev. 551.) 
The rule has been said to be unsound: "[F]irst, because an 
office created or authorized by the legislature should be treated 
as de jure until declared otherwise by a competent tribunal, 
since a statute must be received and obeyed by the individual 
until questioned in, and set aside by, the courts, because every 
statute is presumed to be constitutional; second, because the 
same reasons behind the rule protecting the acts of a de facto 
officer in a de jure office equally apply to acts of a de facto 
officer in a de facto ofiice; third, because the attack on the 
constitutionality of the ofiice should not be made collaterally 
by private parties but should be brought in an action expressly 
for the purpose of questioning the validity of acts of an ofiicer 
under an unconstitutional statute, for to allow individuals 
who deal with public officers to question their authority in 
every instance would be productive of uncertainty and of a 
disordered society; and fourth, because, historically, the Eng-
lish rule requiring a de jure ofiice, from which the majority 
American rule is derived, is not so productive of harsh re-
sults, since the acts of English ofiicials are not declared void 
because the ofiicer was acting under an unconstitutional 
statute." (9 So.Cal.L.Rev. 189, 206.) There are as many 
authorities to the contrary. (See cases collected, 9 So.Cal. 
L.Rev. 207; 99 A.L.R. 294.) 'rhere are so many so-called 
exceptions to the rule or qualifications as to what is a de jure 
ofiice that it cannot be said to have invariable application. 
Where an ofiice is created by an unconstitutional statute, a 
person holding ofiice under the statute before it is declared 
unconstitutional may be a de facto ofiicer. (Statement in 
State v. Carroll, 38 Conn. 449 [9 Am.Rep. 409], approved 
in People v. Hecht, supra, 105 Cal. 621; Oakland Pav. Co. v. 
Donovan, s·upra, 19 Cal.App. 488; Reclamation Dist. No. 70 
v. Sherman, 11 Cal.App. 399 [105 P. 277] ; Kitts v. Superior 
Court, supra, 5 Cal.App. 462.) If the office has potential 
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existence-has not been established but may be-a person 
holding it is a de facto officer. (Buck v. City of Enreka, 
s~tpra, 109 Cal. 504.) After a judge's term expires and his 
successor is selected, the former may be a de facto judge. 
(JYiercecl Bank v. Rosenthal, 99 Cal. 39 [31 P. 849,33 P. 732].) 
Even if the de jure office rule is applied, it appears that 
within the reason of the qualification heretofore noted, there 
is a de jure office-a court, the superior court, and judges of 
such court-and it was to act in the capacity of such a judge 
that Moncur was assigned. 'l'he method of naming him was 
invalid but he was a de facto judge. He had a clear color 
of title by reason of the express legislative authority for his 
assignment (Judges' Retirement Act, supra) and was regu-
larly assigned by the person authorized to make it. 
SCHAUER, J., Concurring and Dissenting.-Insofar as 
the merits of the controversy are concerned I agree with the 
discussion in the majority opinion; as to the power of the 
acting judge, I find in our Constitution no authority for, but 
much in negation of, the chameleonic status of the retired 
judge envisioned in such majority opinion. 
Accordingly, I concur in the judgment of affirmance solely 
because by a long line of respectable authority the acts of 
acting pro tempore ,Judge Moncur have validity as those of 
a de facto officer performing the duties of a de jure court. 
